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Abstract	  Recent	   literature	   on	   causation	   invokes	   a	   distinction	   between	   deviant	   and	   default	  behavior	   to	   account	   for	   token	   causation.	   Critical	   examination	   of	   two	   prominent	  attempts	   to	   employ	   a	   distinction	   between	   deviants	   and	   defaults	   reveals	   that	   the	  distinction	   is	   far	   from	   clear.	   I	   clarify	   and	  develop	   the	   distinction	   by	   appeal	   to	   the	  notion	  of	  a	  modally	  robust	  process,	  and	  show	  how	  the	  distinction	  can	  be	  employed	  by	  causal	  process	  theorists	  to	  respond	  to	  cases	  of	  causation	  by	  omission.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  default/deviant	  distinction	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  tool	  for	  counterfactual	  accounts	  of	  causation,	  but	  rather	  for	  causal	  process	  theory.	  	  
Introduction	  	  With	   his	   strong	   left	   foot,	   the	   striker	   sends	   the	   ball	   towards	   the	   goal,	   the	   goalie	  already	  beaten	  on	  his	   right.	   Just	  before	   the	  goal	   line,	   one	  of	   the	   central	  defenders	  sticks	  out	  his	   foot,	  and	   the	  ball	   is	  knocked	  wide	  behind	   the	  goal	   for	  a	  corner	  kick.	  Disappointed	  we	  sit	  back	  down.	  We	  had	  seen	  that	  one	  in	  goal	  already.	  How	  do	  we	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know	  that	  a	  goal	  would	  have	  been	  scored,	  had	  it	  not	  been	  for	  the	  central	  defender’s	  last	  minute	  action?	  	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  pursue	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  anticipate	  the	  behavior	  of	  systems	  based	  on	  their	   default	   behavior.	   The	   default	   behavior	   of	   a	   well-­‐‑struck	   soccer	   ball	   is	   to	  continue	   on	   its	   trajectory,	   not	   to	   swerve	   randomly,	   come	   to	   a	   sudden	   halt,	   or	   to	  explode.	   The	   ball’s	   default	   behavior	   allows	   us	   to	   form	   expectations,	   and	   it	   also	  influences	   our	   causal	   reasoning.	   It	   was	   the	   defender’s	   action	   that	   prevented	   the	  goal;	   it	   was	   his	   doing	   that	   caused	   the	   corner	   kick.	   A	   system’s	   default	   behavior,	  intuitively,	   is	   the	   behavior	   a	   system	   exhibits	   under	   normal	   circumstances,	   when	  nothing	  interferes	  with	  it.	  	  The	  question	  I	  will	  address	  is	  how	  we	  should	  understand	  this	  intuitive	  appeal	  to	  ‘default’	  behavior,	  and	  how	  we	  can	  use	  a	  more	  careful	  distinction	  between	  default	  and	   deviant	   behavior	   in	   our	   accounts	   of	   token	   causation.	   Token	   causation	   is	  commonly	   taken	   to	   be	   a	   relation	   between	   two	   particular	   events	   c	   and	   e:	   the	  defender’s	  sticking	  out	  his	  foot	  in	  that	  crucial	  moment	  in	  the	  87th	  minute	  caused	  the	  ball’s	  ending	  up	  behind	  the	  goal.  	  In	  section	  one	  I	  look	  at	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  distinction	  between	  defaults	  and	  deviants	  has	  recently	  been	  employed	  to	  fix	  the	  counterfactual	  analysis	  of	  causation.	  Neither	  approach	  is	  entirely	  satisfactory,	  but	  they	  show	  how	  a	  distinction	  between	  defaults	  and	  deviants	  might	  be	  useful	  for	  understanding	  token	  causation.	  In	  section	  two	  I	  clarify	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  by	  showing	  that	  defaults	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	   of	   processes.	   Since	   this	   notion	   of	   a	   default	   initially	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   suitable	  primarily	  for	  fundamental	  physics,	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  apparent	  how	  to	  employ	  it	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for	   the	   cases	   of	   interest	   to	   theories	   of	   token	   causation.	   I	   then	   offer	   an	   analogy	   to	  show	  how	  we	  can	  expand	   the	  narrow	  notion	  of	  a	  default	   to	   typical	   cases	  of	   token	  causation,	  by	  showing	  what	  it	  means	  for	  a	  complex	  system	  to	  be	  in	  a	  default	  state.	  Using	   the	   clarified	   and	   expanded	   notion	   of	   a	   default	   from	   section	   two,	   I	   show	   in	  section	  three	  how	  a	  process	  theory	  of	  causation	  can	  employ	  this	  improved	  notion	  of	  a	   default	   to	   solve	   one	   of	   its	  most	   pressing	   problem	   cases,	   causation	   by	   omission,	  while	  remaining	  an	  adequate	  model	  for	  prevention	  and	  pre-­‐‑emption.	  	  
1.	  Defaults	  and	  the	  counterfactual	  theory	  of	  causation	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  defaults	  and	  deviants	  has	  recently	  come	  to	  the	  forefront	  in	  discussions	  of	   the	  counterfactual	   theory	  of	  causation.	  The	  counterfactual	   theory	  of	  causation	  begins	  with	   the	  simple	   idea	   that	  an	  event	  c	   is	  a	  cause	  of	  an	  event	  e	   iff	  e	  would	  not	  have	  occurred,	  had	  c	  not	  occurred,	  that	  is	  iff	  e	  counterfactually	  depends	  on	  c.	  As	  we	  all	  know,	  this	  simple	  analysis	  will	  not	  do.	  There	  are	  systematic	  ways	  to	  create	  counterexamples:	  either	  by	  showing	  that	  e	  does	  not	  counterfactually	  depend	  on	  c,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  are	   inclined	   to	  count	  c	   as	  a	   (token)	  cause	  of	  e	   (as	   in	  cases	   or	   preemption	   and	   symmetric	   overdetermination),	   or	   by	   showing	   that	   e	  counterfactually	  depends	  on	  some	  event	  or	  condition	  g	   that	  we	  are	  not	   inclined	  to	  count	   as	   a	   cause	   of	   e	   (typical	   cases	   are	   background	   conditions	   and	   omissions).	  Counterexamples	   generated	   along	   these	   lines,	   as	   well	   as	   ever	  more	   sophisticated	  responses	  to	  them,	  make	  up	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  counterfactual	  analysis	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of	  causation.2	  Typical	  counterexamples	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  counterfactual	  dependence	  is	  sufficient	  for	  causation	  are	  cases	  of	  omission.	  	  
Omission	  Assassin	  poisons	  Victim’s	  coffee.	  Victim’s	  Bodyguard	  is	  in	  possession	  of	  an	  antidote,	  but	  does	  not	  administer	  it.	  Victim	  drinks	  the	  coffee	  and	  dies	  shortly	  afterwards.	  Victim’s	   death	   after	   drinking	   the	   coffee	   counterfactually	   depends	   both	   on	   the	  poisoning	  and	  on	  the	  failure	  to	  administer	  the	  antidote.	  But	  while	  we	  certainly	  count	  the	  poisoning	  of	   the	  coffee	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death,	  most	  of	  us	   tend	   to	  be	   less	  inclined	  to	  call	  the	  failure	  to	  administer	  the	  antidote	  a	  cause	  of	  death.	  Even	  if	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  count	  the	  failure	  to	  administer	  the	  antidote	  among	  the	  causes	  of	  victim’s	  death,	  we	  are	  still	  inclined	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  poisoning	  of	  the	  coffee	  and	  the	  failure	  to	  administer	  the	  antidote.	  The	  challenge	  for	  any	  counterfactual	  dependence	  account	  of	  causation	   is	   to	  explain	   the	  difference	   in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  two	  events.	  	  
Omission	  and	  similar	  cases	  where	  events	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  caused	  by	  all	  of	  the	  events	   they	  counterfactually	  depend	  on,	  prompt	  Christopher	  Hitchcock	  (2007)	  to	   offer	   a	   “disjunctive”	   theory	   of	   causation;	   he	   thinks	   that	   for	   some	   cases,	  counterfactual	  dependence	  is	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  token	  causation,	  while	  in	  other	  cases	   it	   is	  either	  not	  necessary	  or	  not	  sufficient.	  Any	  such	  disjunctive	  theory	  obviously	  owes	  us	  an	  account	  of	  what	  distinguishes	  these	  different	  cases,	  otherwise	  the	  theory	  has	  no	  bite.	  Hitchcock	  provides	  a	  detailed	  recipe	  for	  telling	  whether	  the	  relation	  between	  two	  events	  is	  that	  of	  token	  causation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  an	  excellent	  overview,	  see	  Collins	  et.	  al.	  2004.	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First,	   Hitchcock	   says,	   build	   a	   causal	   model,	   where	   “[a]	   causal	   model	   is	   an	  ordered	  pair	  <V,	  E>,	  where	  V	  is	  a	  set	  of	  variables	  and	  E	  is	  a	  set	  of	  equations	  among	  these	  variables.”	   (Hitchcock,	  2007,	  499)	  Then,	   crucially,	  ask	  whether	   this	  model	   is	  
self-­‐‑contained.	  A	   self-­‐‑contained	  model,	   according	   to	  Hitchcock	   is	   a	  model	   in	  which	  “every	   variable	   X∈V	   satisfies	   PSR	   [the	   Principle	   of	   Sufficient	   Reason,	   see	   below]”	  (Hitchcock,	   2007,	   509).	   More	   specifically,	   ask	   not	   just	   whether	   the	  model	   is	   self-­‐‑contained,	   but	   whether	   certain	   elements	   of	   the	   model,	   causal	   networks,	   are	   self-­‐‑contained.	  A	  causal	  model	  can	  contain	  certain	  kinds	  of	  subsets	  of	  variables,	  causal	  networks,	  which,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  analyzing	  the	  causal	  relationships,	  may	  have	  to	  be	  distinguished.3	  Whether	  a	  causal	  network	  is	  self-­‐‑contained	  is	  the	  crucial	  question	  for	  the	  disjunctive	  theory	   of	   token	   causation.	   If	   the	   network	   is	   self-­‐‑contained,	   counterfactual	  dependence	  is	  a	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  causation.	  Counterexamples	  to	   the	   counterfactual	   theory	   of	   causation	   arise	   only	   in	   cases	   where	   the	   causal	  networks	   are	   not	   self-­‐‑contained.	   Hitchcock	   suggests	   that	   when	   there	   is	  counterfactual	  dependence	  between	  events	  in	  networks	  that	  are	  not	  self-­‐‑contained,	  the	   dependence	   is	   ‘parasitic’,	   and	   not	   sufficient	   for	   token	   causation.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	  one	  event	  may	  be	  a	  token	  cause	  of	  another	  event	  in	  a	  network	  that	  is	  not	  self-­‐‑contained,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  counterfactual	  dependence	  between	  them;	  to	  come	  to	  the	  right	  conclusions	  on	  those	  cases,	  more	  complicated	  theories	  are	  needed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  More	  formally:	  “Let	  <V,	  E>	  be	  a	  causal	  model,	  and	  let	  X,	  Y	  ∈	  V.	  The	  causal	  network	  connecting	  X	  to	  Y	  in	  <V,	  E>	  is	  the	  set	  N⊂V	  that	  contains	  exactly	  X,Y,	  and	  all	  variables	  
Z∈V	  lying	  on	  a	  directed	  path	  from	  X	  to	  Y	  in	  <V,	  E>”	  (Hitchcock,	  2007,	  509).	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It	  is	  in	  distinguishing	  self-­‐‑contained	  networks	  from	  other	  networks,	  that	  Hitchcock	  appeals	   to	   a	   distinction	   between	   defaults	   and	   deviants.	   Intuitively,	   in	   a	   self-­‐‑contained	  network,	  the	  deviant	  value	  of	  any	  variable	  other	  than	  the	  first	  one	  can	  be	  explained	   by	   the	   deviant	   value	   of	   one	   or	   more	   of	   its	   parent	   variables.	   The	   idea	  behind	  this	  is	  the	  Principle	  of	  Sufficient	  Reason,	  which	  Hitchcock	  formulates	  in	  terms	  of	   default	   and	   deviant	   values	   of	   variables:	   “when	   a	   set	   of	   variables	   all	   take	   their	  default	   value,	   they	   cannot	  by	   themselves	   cause	   another	   variable	   to	   take	   a	  deviant	  value”	  (Hitchcock,	  2007,	  508).	  	  These	   tools	   can	   be	   used	   to	   address	   the	   type	   of	   counterexample	   described	   above.	  With	  ‘0’	  standing	  for	  the	  default	  value	  of	  a	  variable,	  and	  ‘1’	  for	  the	  deviant	  value,	  the	  causal	  model	  for	  Omission	  looks	  like	  this:	  	  
Variables:  A=1	  if	  Assassin	  poisons	  Victim’s	  coffee,	  0	  if	  not.	  	  B=1	  if	  Bodyguard	  administers	  the	  antidote,	  0	  if	  not.	  	  D=1	  if	  Victim	  dies,	  0	  if	  not.	    	  
Equations:	  A=1  	  B=0  	  D=	  A	  &	  ¬B	  	  Within	   this	   causal	   model,	   two	   causal	   networks	   can	   be	   distinguished:	   the	   causal	  network	  {A,D}	  and	  the	  causal	  network	  {B,D}.	  {A,D}	  is	  self-­‐‑contained,	  and	  D	  depends	  counterfactually	  on	  A.	  Hence,	  given	  the	  analysis	  offered	  by	  Hitchcock,	  A	  counts	  as	  a	  token	   cause	   of	   D.	   But	   while	   D	   also	   counterfactually	   depends	   on	   B,	   the	   causal	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network	  {B,D}	  is	  not	  self-­‐‑contained:	  D	  takes	  a	  deviant	  value	  if	  B	  takes	  a	  default	  value.	  By	  Hitchcock’s	  analysis,	  that	  means	  the	  counterfactual	  dependence	  does	  not	  indicate	  a	  causal	  relationship.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  causal	  networks	  explains	  the	  difference	   in	   intuition	  between	  the	  two	  cases:	  while	  A	   is	  definitely	  a	  cause	  of	  D,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  B	  our	  intuitions	  are	  less	  clear.	  	  Hitchcock’s	   solution,4	  then,	  depends	  on	   the	  distinction	  between	  self-­‐‑contained	  and	  not	  self-­‐‑contained	  networks,	  which	  is	  in	  turn	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  default/deviant	  distinction.	   Hitchcock’s	   solution	   nicely	   explains	   our	   intuitions,	   in	   particular	   our	  inclination	  to	  distinguish	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Victim’s	  death	  depends	  on	  the	  poisoning	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  depends	  on	  Bodyguard’s	  failure	  to	  administer	  the	  antidote.	  His	   recipe,	   however,	   is	   designed	   to	   handle	   only	   cases	   where	   counterfactual	  dependence	   is	  not	  sufficient.	  As	  he	  himself	  acknowledges,	   there	   is	   token	  causation	  outside	  of	  self-­‐‑contained	  networks,	  and	  for	  those	  cases,	  more	  complicated	  theories	  are	  needed.	  	  If	  Hitchcock’s	  main	  concern	  has	  been	  with	  counterexamples	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  counterfactual	  dependence	   is	  sufficient	   for	  causation,	  Ned	  Hall	   (2007)	   is	  primarily	  interested	   in	   examples	   that	   seem	   to	   show	   that	   counterfactual	   dependence	   is	   not	  necessary	  for	  causation.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Hitchcock offers similar explanations for other examples where counterfactual 
dependence does not seem to suffice for causation.	  
5	  Another reason for introducing a distinction between default and deviant states are 
counterexamples to the structural equations account of causation. Hall constructs two 
scenarios about which we have differing causal intuitions—in one case we are inclined to 
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Preemption	  Assassin	  puts	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  poison	  into	  victim’s	  coffee.	  Unbeknownst	  to	  him,	  Badgirl	  also	  poisons	  Victim’s	  coffee,	  but	  with	  a	  different	  poison	  that	  acts	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  Assassin’s	  poison,	  while	  still	  remaining	  lethal	  itself.	  Victim	  drinks	  the	  coffee	  and	  dies.	  This	  type	  of	  example	  suggests	  that	  counterfactual	  dependence	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  causation,	  since	  it	  seems	  that	  Badgirl’s	  poisoning	  of	  the	  coffee	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death,	  but	   it	   is	  not	   true	  that	  Victim	  would	  not	  have	  died	  had	  Badgirl	  not	  poisoned	  the	  coffee.	  After	  all,	   in	  that	  case	  Victim	  would	  have	  died	  from	  Assassin’s	  poisoning	  instead.	  Hall	  suggests	  that	  in	  cases	  where	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  judge	  that	  an	  event	  c	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  another	  event,	  e,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  e	  does	  not	  counterfactually	  depend	  on	  c,	  the	  counterfactual	  dependence	  is	  masked	  by	  surrounding	  events.	  According	  to	  Hall,	  what	  matters	  for	  causation	  is	  not	  just	  whether	  e	  counterfactually	  depends	  on	  c	  in	   the	   actual	   situation,	   but	  whether	   there	   is	   a	   nomologically	   possible	   situation	   in	  which	  it	  does.	  	  The	  intuitive	  idea	  is	  clear:	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  Assassin’s	  poisoning	  of	  the	  coffee,	  Victim’s	   death	   would	   counterfactually	   depend	   on	   Badgirl’s	   poisoning.	   So	   perhaps	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
count a particular event, c, as a cause of event e, in the other case we are not inclined to 
do so. Then he shows that the two scenarios have isomorphic structures, hence the 
structural equations account has to treat them alike. This prompts Hall to look for a non-
structural difference between the two approaches, which he finds by distinguishing 
default from deviant states.  
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the	  reason	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  call	  Badgirl’s	  poisoning	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death	  is	  that	  we	   see	   the	   counterfactual	   dependence	   as	   hidden	   by	   the	   circumstances.	   In	   other	  circumstances,	  Victim’s	  death	  would	  counterfactually	  depend	  on	  Badgirl’s	  poisoning	  of	   the	   coffee.	   Of	   course,	   once	   we	   are	   willing	   to	   look	   for	   ‘masked’	   or	   ‘hidden’	  counterfactual	  dependence,	  we	  need	  to	  protect	  against	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  paranoia—we	   need	   to	   have	   some	   limit	   in	   place	   that	   tells	   us	   when	   to	   look	   for	   masked	  dependence,	   otherwise	   we	   will	   start	   seeing	   counterfactual	   dependence	   even	   in	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  none.	  To	  prevent	  paranoia,	  we	  need	  another	  recipe.	  	  Like	  Hitchcock,	  Hall	  begins	  by	  building	  a	  causal	  model.	  To	  reduce	  a	  complex	  situation,	   in	  which	   counterfactual	  dependence	  might	  be	  masked,	   to	  a	   simpler	  one,	  we	  construct	  a	  nomologically	  possible	   situation	  where	  only	  events	  occur	   that	  also	  occur	   in	   the	  original	  situation,	  but	   in	  which	  some	  previously	  deviant	  variables	  are	  now	  assigned	  default	  values.6	  	  “In	  one	  situation,	  lots	  of	  events	  occur—that	  is,	  various	  bits	  of	   the	  world	  exhibit	  deviations	   from	   their	  default	   states.	   In	   another	   situation,	  strictly	  fewer	  events	  occur—that	  is,	  some	  of	  the	  bits	  of	  the	  world	  that	  are	  in	  deviant	  states	  in	  the	  first	  situation	  are	  in	  their	  default	  states	  instead;	  and	  every	  other	  bit	  is	  in	  the	  same	  state	  as	  it	  was.”	  (Hall,	  2007,	  129)	  The	  only	  values	  we	  get	  to	  change	  by	  hand	  are	  the	  values	  of	  exogenous	  variables,	  that	  is,	  variables	  that	  have	  no	  parents	  in	  the	  model.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A similar account is offered by Stephen Yablo, who suggests that we ‘hold certain 
things fixed’ to find out whether an event ‘de facto depends’ on some other event (Yablo, 
2002).	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Applied	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Preemption	  we	  unmask	  the	  counterfactual	  dependence	  of	  Victim’s	  death	  on	  Badgirl’s	  poisoning	  the	  coffee,	  by	  reducing	  the	  original	  situation	  to	  a	  simpler	  version	  of	  it,	  where	  Assassin’s	  actions	  are	  set	  to	  a	  default	  value	  of	  non-­‐‑poisoning,	  and	  Badgirl’s	  actions	  remain	  the	  same.	  In	  the	  reduced	  situation,	  Victim’s	  death	  does	  counterfactually	  depend	  on	  Badgirl’s	  poisoning	  the	  coffee,	  and	  hence	  we	  are	  back	  to	  a	  case	  where	  counterfactual	  dependence	  is	  necessary	  for	  causation.	  	  Could	  the	  same	  argument	  be	  used	  to	  make	  Assassin’s	  poisoning	  of	  the	  coffee	  a	  cause	  of	  victim’s	  death?	  No,	   says	  Hall,7	  because	   the	  situation	  where	  Badgirl	  does	  not	   poison	   the	   coffee	   is	   not	   a	   reduction	  of	   the	   original	   situation.	   For	   consider	   the	  state	   of	   Victim’s	   coffee	   after	   Assassin	   has	   put	   in	   his	   poison.	   The	   default	   state	   for	  coffee	  is	  not	  to	  be	  poisoned,	  but	  since	  Assassin	  has	  put	  his	  poison	  in,	  that	  is	  not	  the	  state	   of	   the	   coffee.	   The	   actual	   state	   of	   the	   coffee—in	   the	   original	   situation—is	  poisoned,	   but	   with	   Badgirl’s	   poison,	   not	   Assassin’s,	   since	   Badgirl’s	   poison	  neutralizes	   Assassin’s.	   So	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   Assassin	   poisons	   the	   coffee,	   but	  Badgirl	  does	  not,	  is	  not	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  original	  situation	  since	  it	  leaves	  one	  state	  in	  neither	  its	  default	  state,	  nor	  its	  actual	  state,	  but	  in	  a	  different	  deviant	  state.	  	  Like	   Hitchcock,	   then,	   Hall	   uses	   a	   distinction	   between	   defaults	   and	   deviants	   to	  identify	   situations	   in	   which	   counterfactual	   dependence	   is	   an	   indicator	   for	   causal	  relationships,	  except	  that	  Hall	  looks	  at	  cases	  where	  counterfactual	  dependence	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  necessary,	  whereas	  Hitchcock	   is	   interested	   in	  cases	  where	   it	   is	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Hall actually makes this point using an abstract ‘neuron diagram’; the details of the 
example are mine.  
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sufficient.	  As	  Hitchcock	   (2009)	  has	  argued,	  however,	  Hall’s	   approach	   relies	  on	   the	  background	   circumstances	   being	   deviants,	   since	   only	   then	   can	   they	   be	   ‘set	   to	  defaults’	  to	  reveal	  masked	  dependence.	  If	  the	  background	  conditions	  that	  mask	  the	  dependence	   are	   themselves	   already	   defaults,	   no	   reduction	   of	   the	   situation	   is	  possible.	  Hall’s	  approach,	  then,	  looks	  somewhat	  less	  promising	  than	  Hitchcock’s.	  	  
2.	  Clarifying	  and	  expanding	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  	  Hall’s	   and	   Hitchcock’s	   discussions	   suggest	   that	   defaults	   are	   useful	   for	   under-­‐‑standing	   token	   causation.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   both	   of	   them	   use	   the	   term	   ‘default’	  relatively	   loosely,	   applying	   it	   to	   states,	   the	   values	   of	   variables,	   and	   outcomes.	  Similarly,	  assigning	  the	  status	  of	  a	  default	  to	  some	  of	  these	  variables	  or	  states	  was	  usually	   done	   intuitively.	   While	   the	   specific	   assignments	   seem	   plausible	   enough,	  assigning	  default	  status	  in	  this	  manner	  can	  suggest	  that	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  default	  is	  largely	  a	  matter	  of	  context,	  and	  perhaps	  our	  own	  expectations.8	  This	  may	  be	   fine	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	  our	   causal	   reasoning	  works,	   but	   it	   is	   less	  clear	  that	  it	  will	  suffice	  for	  a	  metaphysical	  account	  of	  causation.	  If	   it	  turns	  out	  that	  our	   best	   causal	   reasoning	   relies	   on	   assigning	   the	   status	   of	   defaults	   to	   states	   or	  outcomes,	  then	  a	  metaphysical	  approach	  should	  say	  what	  the	  world	  must	  be	  like	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Hitchcock	   suggests	   that	   what	   counts	   as	   a	   default	   may	   depend	   on	   the	   “level	   of	  analysis”	  (2007,	  506).	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order	  for	  those	  assignments	  to	  be	  vindicated.9	  My	  suggestion	  in	  this	  section	  is	  that	  assigning	   the	   status	   of	   defaults	   (or	   deviants)	   to	   states	   and	   outcomes	   requires	  processes.	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  a	  default	  is	  a	  default	  relative	  to	  a	  process.10  	  In	  what	  follows	   I	   will	   use	   the	   term	   ‘behavior’	   as	   a	   metaphysically	   neutral	   way	   of	   talking	  about	  the	  items	  which	  may	  be	  characterized	  as	  ‘defaults’,	  before	  developing	  a	  more	  technical	  analysis.11	  Intuitively,	  default	  behavior	  is	  uniform,	  normal,	  or	  orderly.	  The	  question	  is	  what	  we	  need	  to	  assume	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  these	  ascriptions.	  	  Take	   one	   of	   the	   paradigms	   of	   default	   behavior—inertial	  motion.12	  	  Inertial	  motion	  goes	   well	   with	   the	   Principle	   of	   Sufficient	   Reason:	   if	   a	   system	   in	   inertial	   motion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Not	  everybody	  interested	  in	  understanding	  causal	  reasoning	  will	  be	  interested	  in	  pursuing	   this	  metaphysical	   project.	   Halpern	   (2008)	   seems	   primarily	   interested	   in	  causal	  reasoning	  without	  attempting	  to	  give	  a	  metaphysical	  account.	  	  
10	  Hitchcock	  indeed	  at	  one	  point	  speaks	  of	  “deviant	  and	  default	  outcomes	  of	  various	  processes”	   (Hitchcock,	   2007,	   498),	   but	   he	   never	   suggests	   that	   states	   are	   defaults	  relative	  to	  processes.	  	  
11	  It	   is	  difficult	   to	   find	  a	  neutral	   term	  that	   fits	  all	   the	  relevant	  cases	  and	  examples.	  Although	   ‘behavior’	   has	   its	   drawbacks,	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   good	   fit	   for	   some	   of	   the	  central	   cases,	   like	   inertial	   motion.	   I	   haste	   to	   add	   that	   while	   ‘behavior’	   is	   often	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  of	  agents,	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  imply	  that	  behavior	  must	  agential.	  	  
12	  Inertial	  motion	   is	   recognized	   by	   all	   parties	   to	   be	   default	   behavior;	   its	   status	   as	  such	   is	   especially	   emphasized	  by	  Tim	  Maudlin	   (2007)	   and	  Halpern	   and	  Hitchcock	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changes	   its	   behavior,	  we	   have	   to	   look	   for	   a	   prior	   deviation	   of	   that	   system,	   or	  we	  have	  to	  look	  outside	  the	  system	  itself,	  to	  discover	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  change.	  Systems	  in	   inertial	  motion	  do	  not	   just	   change	   their	   behavior	   on	   their	   own.	  Notice,	   though,	  that	  in	  order	  to	  say,	  at	  any	  moment,	  that	  a	  body	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  inertial	  motion,	  we	  have	   to	  make	   reference	   to	   the	   earlier	   and	   later	  behavior	  of	   that	   body.	   It	   is	   only	   a	  state	  of	   inertial	  motion	   if	   the	  body	   is	  moving	  at	  uniform	  velocity,	  and	  whether	  the	  velocity	   at	   any	   given	   moment	   is	   uniform	   depends	   on	   what	   the	   velocity	   is	  immediately	  before	  and	  after.	  	  To	  better	  describe	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  cases	  like	  these,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  borrow	  a	   conception	  of	  processes	   recently	   introduced	  by	  Helen	  Steward	   (Steward,	  2013):	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  process	  as	  a	  modally	  robust	  individual.	  Proceeding	  from	  a	  distinction 
between events and processes, she suggests that we should recognize individual 
processes as entities with their own identity conditions, independent of the identity 
of their temporal parts. The motivating thought is that we sometimes recognize 
that a process, which was in fact interrupted, would have continued in a certain 
way, which suggests that we do not always treat processes as individuated by their 
(spatio-)temporal parts alone: the same processes could have gone on for longer, 
or it could have stopped earlier. To support such claims we need to think of a 
process as modally more robust than the mereological essentialist would allow; for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2014),	  who	  write	   “The	  classic	  example	   is	   from	  Newtonian	  mechanics:	   the	  default	  behaviour	  of	  a	  body	  is	  to	  continue	  in	  a	  state	  of	  uniform	  motion”	  (p.21).	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the mereological essentialist, any change in the temporal parts of a process 
constitutes a change in the identity of the process. Steward suggests that individual 
processes have “modal robustness in virtue of form” (Steward, 2013, 807). 	  This	  modal	  robustness	   in	  virtue	  of	   form	   is	  a	  property	  processes	  share	  with	  ordinary	   substances,	   like	   statues	   and	   cats.	  We	  usually	   think	   that	   a	   statue	   losing	   a	  finger,	   or	   a	   cat	   losing	   some	  hair	   on	  my	   couch,	   remain	   the	   self-­‐‑same	   statue	   or	   cat,	  despite	  having	  undergone	  a	  change	  in	  their	  respective	  parts.	  Steward’s	  proposal	   is	  that	   we	   say	   the	   same	   about	   a	   process	   that	   has	   been	   interrupted,	   and	   is	   hence	  missing	   some	   of	   its	   temporal	   parts.	   In	   both	   cases	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   distinguish	   the	  process	  or	  substance	  from	  its	  spatial	  or	  temporal	  parts,	  because	  its	  identity	  depends	  on	  its	  form,	  and	  not	  merely	  on	  the	  parts	  that	  compose	  it.	  The	  form	  of	  a	  process,	  then,	  has	  to	  provide	  identity	  conditions	  for	  a	  process,	  which	  allow	  us	  to	  pick	  out	  the	  same	  process	  across	  different	  modal	  contexts.	  The	  question	  is,	  of	  course,	  which	  features	  of	  a	  process	  might	  be	  suitable	  to	  do	  so.	  	  I	   am	   proposing	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   default	   has	   its	   natural	   home	   in	   this	  conception	  of	  a	  process	  as	  an	  individual	  process.	  Such	  a	  process	  has	  temporal	  parts,	  and	  may	  consist	  of	  heterogeneous	  stages	  (Steward,	  2013,	  805),	  but	  these	  different	  stages	  hang	  together	  in	  a	  suitable	  way,	  given	  by	  the	  form	  of	  the	  process.	  I	  would	  like	  to	   call	   a	   stage	   of	   a	   process	   that	   sufficiently	   preserves	   the	   form	   of	   the	   process	   a	  default	  relative	  to	  that	  process.	  In	  an	  individual	  process	  there	  is	  a	  natural	  ‘next	  step’	  or	  ‘next	  stage’	  that	  would	  fit	  with	  the	  process	  as	  a	  whole,	  by	  preserving	  the	  form	  of	  the	  process.	  Such	  natural	  next	  stages,	  I	  suggest,	  are	  default	  stages,	  and	  since	  which	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stage	   is	  a	  natural	  next	  step	  depends	  on	  the	  process,	  default	  stages	  will	  be	  defaults	  relative	  to	  processes.	  	  To	   apply	   this	   general	   idea	   to	   the	   cases	   of	   token	   causation	   from	  which	  we	  started,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  better	  the	  sources	  of	  ‘form’	  for	  a	  process.	  Steward	  is	  primarily	   concerned	   with	   cases	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   action,	   and	   accordingly	  proposes	  agents’	  intentions	  as	  the	  source	  of	  form	  for	  processes.	  The	  cases	  I	  will	  be	  concerned	  with	  here	  are	  of	  a	  different	  sort,	  so	  I	  will	  be	  introducing	  different	  sources	  of	  form	  for	  processes.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  processes	  may	  be	  said	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  form	  in	   virtue	   of	   being	   uniform,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   inertial	   motion.	   In	   those	   cases,	   the	  default	  next	  step	  will	  be	  to	  preserve	  the	  uniformity	  of	  the	  process	  by	  leaving	  certain	  quantities	  unchanged,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  velocity.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  processes	  may	  be	  said	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  form	  in	  virtue	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  systems.	  	  As	  long	  as	  our	  interest	  is	  only	  in	  Newtonian	  bodies	  and	  processes	  of	  inertial	  motion,	   the	   characterization	   of	   the	   processes,	   and	   accordingly,	   that	   of	   the	   default	  states,	   is	   going	   to	   be	   relatively	   simple.	   Indeed,	   because	   processes	   in	   fundamental	  physics	  seem	  to	  be	  most	  readily	  characterized	  as	  uniform	  or	  stable,	  causal	  process	  theorists	  have	  tried	  to	  build	  their	  account	  of	  causation	  on	  such	  processes,	  and	  have	  in	  turn	  characterized	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  conserved	  quantities	  Dowe	  (2000).13	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  processes	  in	  fundamental	  physics	  exhibit	  uniformity,	  or	  that	   accounts	   in	   terms	   of	   conserved	   quantities	   are	   unproblematic	   in	   all	   areas	   of	  fundamental	   physics.	   But	   insofar	   as	   we	   understand	   a	   process	   as	   uniform,	   the	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Most	  cases	  of	  token	  causation	  in	  the	  literature,	  however,	  do	  not	  deal	  with	  examples	  from	   fundamental	   physics,	   but	  with	  mundane	   cases	   involving	   entities	   like	   human	  beings	   dying	   from	   poison.	   Such	   entities	   undergo	   numerous	   different	   processes	   at	  any	   given	   moment:	   Victim,	   for	   example,	   might	   be	   at	   rest	   in	   an	   armchair,	   while	  drinking	  coffee,	  breathing,	  reading	  the	  news,	  and,	  involuntarily,	  ingesting	  the	  poison	  put	   in	   the	   coffee	   by	   Assassin—to	   list	   only	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	   processes	   Victim	  undergoes.	   In	   those	   cases,	   it	   seems,	   we	   start	   from	   relatively	   stable	   systems,	   like	  Victim,	   and	   events	   that	   happen	   to	   them,	   the	   causes	   of	  which	  will	   typically	   not	   be	  identified	  at	  the	  level	  of	  fundamental	  physical	  processes.14	  So	   far,	   then,	  our	  best	  attempt	  at	  giving	  a	  clear	  notion	  of	   ‘default’	   is	   to	  say	  a	  stage	  is	  a	  default	  in	  a	  process,	  where	  the	  process	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  uniformity	  or	  stability	  over	  time	  characteristic	  of	  certain	  processes	  in	  fundamental	  physics.	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   our	   intended	   application	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   default	   is	   to	   situations	  involving	   complicated,	   but	   relatively	   stable,	   systems	   undergoing	   numerous	  processes	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Is	  there	  any	  way	  of	  bridging	  the	  gap?	  	  Fundamental	   physics	   gives	   us	   one	   understanding	   of	   an	   individual	   process:	  such	  a	  process	  is	  a	  uniform	  unfolding	  of	  stages.	  This	  account	  of	  the	  form	  of	  a	  process	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  relevant	   uniformity	   will	   most	   readily	   be	   found	   in	   certain	   processes	   described	   by	  fundamental	  physics.	  	  	  14	  Whether there is genuine causation at levels other than fundamental physics is of 
course a controversial question.  
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allows	  us	  to	  characterize	  defaults:	  a	  stage	  that	  retains	  the	  uniformity	  of	  the	  process	  is	   a	   default	   relative	   to	   that	   process.	   Call	   this	   the	   narrow	   notion	   of	   a	   default.	   But	  perhaps	   the	   uniformity	   retained	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	   the	   uniformity	   of	   a	   process.	  Could	  it	  be	  the	  uniformity	  of	  a	  system	  as	  well?	  	  A	  way	  of	  extending	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  to	  cover	  cases	  beyond	  fundamental	  physics	  might	   then	  be	   this:	   states	   of	   complex	   systems	   can	  be	  more	   or	   less	   stable.	  Uniformity	   is	  a	  kind	  of	  stability,	   so	  perhaps	  default	  behavior	  preserves	  stability	   in	  general,	   not	   just	   the	   uniformity	   of	   fundamental	   processes.	   By	   analogy	   with	  processes,	  then,	  we	  can	  call	  the	  stable	  states	  of	  a	  complex	  system	  its	  default	  states.	  Call	   this	   the	  wider	  notion	  of	  a	  default.	  What	   the	  narrow	  and	  the	  wider	  notion	  of	  a	  default	   have	   in	   common	   is	   that	   default	   status	   is	   always	   held	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  stability	  of	  some	  other	  entity:	  a	  process	  or	  a	  system.	  It	  is	  relative	  to	  maintaining	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  other	  entity	  that	  a	  stage	  or	  a	  state	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  default.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  complex	  systems,	  it	  is	  the	  systems	  that	  exhibit	  stability,	  not	  the	  processes.	  	  Maintaining	   default	   states	   for	   a	   complex	   system	   typically	   requires	   the	  interaction	  of	  several	  processes,	  which	  themselves	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  uniform.	  So	  initially	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  understand	  the	  stages	  of	  those	  processes	  as	  defaults	  or	   deviants,	   since	   the	   processes	   lack	   uniformity	   and	   our	   best	   understanding	   of	  defaults	  relative	  to	  processes	  was	  as	  stages	  that	  retain	  the	  uniformity	  of	  the	  process.	  However,	  importing	  the	  extended	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  from	  above,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  a	  stage	  is	  a	  default	  relative	  to	  a	  process	  a	  complex	  system	  undergoes	  if	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  system	  undergoing	  the	  process.	  The	  ‘next’	  or	  default	  stage	  in	  a	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process	  is	  the	  one	  that	  contributes	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  system,	  even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  retain	  uniformity	  in	  the	  process.	  	  This	  extension	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  to	  cover	  non-­‐‑uniform	  processes	  fits	  nicely	  with	  the	  description	  of	  processes	  in	  biology	  as	  homeostatic.	  For	  example,	  our	  body’s	  ability	  to	  retain	  a	  relatively	  stable	  internal	  temperature	  relies	  on	  a	  number	  of	  processes	  that	  are	  not	  themselves	  uniform	  in	  the	  way	  inertial	  motion	  is	  uniform,	  but	  which	   together	   result	   in	   a	   relatively	   stable	   state.	   In	   characterizing	   this	   state	   as	   a	  default	  state	  for	  us	  as	  organisms,	  we	  can	  then	  characterize	  stages	  in	  these	  processes	  as	  defaults	  or	  deviants,	  relative	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  our	   body	   temperature.	   This	   allows	   us	   to	   apply	   the	   broader	   notion	   of	   a	   default	   to	  cover	  stages	  in	  processes	  beyond	  the	  processes	  of	  fundamental	  physics.15	  I	  have	  now	  extended	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	   in	  two	  steps.	  First	   in	  extending	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  from	  the	  stages	  of	  fundamental	  processes	  that	  are	  uniform	  to	  the	   stable	   states	   of	   complex	   systems,	   and	   then	   secondly	   in	   using	   this	   extended	  notion	   to	   define	   default	   stages	   for	   the	   numerous	   processes	   contributing	   to	   the	  stability	  of	  a	  complex	  system.	  It	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  we	  have	  to	  proceed	  by	  analogy	  here.	  After	  all,	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  extend	  a	  notion	  fit	  for	  one	  set	  of	  circumstances	  to	  fit	  a	  different	  set	  of	  circumstances.	  Crucially,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  analogy	  we	  have	  found	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  This	  also	  seems	  to	  fit	  well	  with	  Steward’s	  idea	  that	  “many	  processes	  have	  natural	  developments—that	   there	   are	   certain	   types	   of	   unfoldings	   in	   the	  world	  which	   are	  structured	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  termination	  point,	  product,	  or	  ongoing	  production	  cycle	  is	  the	  norm”(Steward,	  2013,	  807).	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way	   of	   assigning	   the	   status	   of	   defaults	   to	   stages	   of	   processes	   even	   for	   cases	  involving	  the	  complicated	  systems	  of	  interest	  to	  token	  causation.	  	  We	  can	  now	  say	   that	  defaults	  are	  either	   stages	   in	  processes	   that	   retain	   the	  uniformity	   of	   the	   process,	   or	   stages	   in	   processes	   that	   retain	   the	   stability	   of	   a	  complex	   system	   undergoing	   those	   processes.	   Since	   the	   processes	   are	   modally	  robust,	  we	  can	  say	  what	  stage	  would	  have	  been	  the	  default	  stage	  to	  occur	  in	  a	  given	  process,	   even	   if	   the	   process	   was	   in	   fact	   interrupted.	   Moreover,	   I	   have	   used	   the	  notion	   of	   a	   default	   state	   to	   characterize	   the	   stability	   of	   complex	   systems.	   A	  somewhat	  accidental	  feature	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  causes	  for	  events	  like	  Victim’s	  death,	  which	  disrupt	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  state	  of	  a	  complex	  system,	  will	  typically	  be	  found	  by	   looking	  at	  processes	   that	   involve	  only	  parts	  of	   that	  complex	  system.	  The	  reason	   is	   that	   complex	   systems	   are	   complex	   precisely	   because	   they	   require	   the	  working	   together	  of	  multiple	  processes,	   some	  of	  which	  may	  only	  occur	   in	  parts	  of	  that	   system.	   Can	   we	   use	   this	   refined	   understanding	   of	   defaults	   to	   solve	   problem	  cases	  in	  token	  causation?	  	  
3	  Process	  theory,	  defaults,	  and	  omissions	  	  Since	   defaults	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   best	   understood	   as	   being	   relative	   to	   processes,	   a	  natural	   place	   to	   turn	   is	   the	   process	   theory	   of	   causation.	  Defenders	   of	   the	   process	  theory	   of	   causation	   have	   long	   held	   that	   processes	   are	   fundamental	   to	   our	  understanding	  of	  causation.	  A	  causal	  process	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  pseudo-­‐‑process)	  has	  recently	  been	  characterized	  as	  “a	  world	  line	  of	  an	  object	  that	  possesses	  a	  conserved	  quantity”,	   and	   a	   causal	   interaction	   as	   “an	   intersection	  of	  world	   lines	   that	   involves	  exchange	  of	  a	  conserved	  quantity”	  (Dowe,	  2000,	  90).	  To	  show	  that	  defaults	  belong	  in	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the	  toolbox	  of	  the	  process	  theorist,	  we	  not	  only	  need	  to	  show	  that	  defaults	  require	  processes,	   but	   also	   that	   defaults	   can	   do	   useful	  work	   for	   the	   process	   theorist.16	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  show	  how	  the	  process	  theorist	  can	  employ	  defaults	  to	  address	  one	  of	  her	  most	  pressing	  problems:	  causation	  by	  omission.	  	  Causation	   by	   omission	   is	   a	   problem	   for	   many	   theories	   of	   causation,	   but	  especially	  so	  for	  the	  process	  theorist.	  Causal	  processes	  are	  processes	  that	  transmit	  causal	   influence,	   and	   while	   different	   proponents	   of	   the	   view	   have	   suggested	  different	  criteria	  for	  identifying	  the	  features	  that	  allow	  processes	  to	  do	  so,	  all	  agree	  that	   transmission	   requires	   that	   the	  events	  are	  physically	   connected.	   It	   seems	  odd,	  however,	   to	   speak	   of	   transmission	   in	   cases	  where	   one	   event	   is	   a	   ‘negative’	   event,	  that	  is,	  an	  ‘absence’	  or	  an	  ‘omission’.17	  	  If	  causal	  interactions	  occur	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	   two	   processes,	   and	   such	   an	   interaction	   involves	   physical	   connection,	   then	   how	  are	  we	  to	  understand	  cases	  where	  something	  happens	  because	  of	  an	  absence?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  In	   what	   follows	   I	   take	   myself	   to	   be	   contributing	   to	   the	   project—called	   for	   by	  Hitchcock	   (2004)—of	   showing	   that	   causal	   processes	   and	   interactions	   can	   do	   real	  philosophical	   work;	   I	   am	   not	   trying	   to	   defend	   a	   particular	   version	   of	   the	   causal	  process	  account.	  	  	  17	  Regardless	  of	  their	  (alleged)	  role	  in	  causation,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  omissions	  are,	  if	   anything,	   is	   itself	   subject	   to	   metaphysical	   debate.	   For	   a	   detailed	   recent	  contribution	   see	   Clarke	   (2014),	   who	   argues	   that	   omissions	   are	   a	   special	   case	   of	  absence	  of	  action,	  but	  who	  aims	  to	  remain	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  omissions.	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The	  trouble	  is,	  as	  Jonathan	  Schaffer	  (2000)	  has	  argued,	  that	  we	  often	  want	  to	  count	  cases	  where	  absences	  or	  omissions	  are	  involved	  as	  cases	  of	  causation:	  the	  absence	  of	   vitamin	   C	   causes	   scurvy,	   the	   lack	   of	   oxygen	   in	   Victim’s	   bloodstream	   caused	  Victim’s	   death,	   and	   the	   power	   failure	   caused	   several	   people	   to	   be	   trapped	   in	   an	  elevator.	  All	  of	  these	  claims	  prima	  facie	  seem	  to	  count	  absences	  or	  negative	  events	  as	   token	  causes,	  which	   suggests	   that	   it	   is	   a	   severe	  disadvantage	   if	   a	   theory	  has	   to	  deny	  that	  absences	  can	  be	  causes.	  	  There	   have	   been	   a	   variety	   of	   responses	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   causation	   by	  omission.	  Some	  philosophers,	  like	  Dowe	  (2001)	  and	  Hall	  (2004)	  have	  suggested	  that	  we	   need	   to	   distinguish	   two	   different	   concepts	   of	   causation,	   one	   of	   which	   is	  applicable	  only	  to	  cases	  of	  positive	  causation.	  Others,	  like	  Beebee	  (2004)	  and	  Varzi	  (2007)	  have	  rejected	  the	   idea	  that	  omissions	  play	  a	  genuine	  role	   in	  causation,	  and	  have	  instead	  suggested	  that	  alleged	  cases	  of	  causation	  by	  omission	  are	  instead	  to	  be	  understood	   (merely)	   as	   cases	   of	   causal	   explanations.	   The	   adequacy	   of	   a	   causal	  explanation	   may	   well	   depend	   on	   matters	   of	   moral	   responsibility,	   and	   it	   is	   with	  respect	   to	   such	   matters	   that	   omissions	   may	   become	   relevant.18	  But	   this	   is	   quite	  different	   from	   the	   truth	   of	   such	   explanations,	   which	   only	   depends	   on	   positive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Clarke’s	  view	  seems	  to	  go	  a	  step	  further,	  in	  that	  he	  defines	  omissions	  as	  absence	  of	  action	  in	  cases	  where	  “an	  action	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  is	  absent	  was	  called	  for	  by	  some	  norm,	  standard,	  or	  ideal”	  (Clarke,	  2014,	  33).	  For	  his	  narrow	  notion	  of	  omission,	  absences	  of	  action	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  omissions	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  norms	  and	  standards.  
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events.	  While	  normative	  considerations	  seem	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  explaining	  our	  causal	  judgments	   for	   certain	   cases	   of	   omissions,	  Hitchcock	   and	  Knobe	   (2009)	   argue	   that	  normative	   considerations	   enter	   into	   causal	   explanations	   and	   judgments	   involving	  positive	  events	  as	  well.	  Hitchcock	  opts	  for	  a	  more	  radical	  response,	  suggesting	  that	  token	  causation	  in	  general	  is	  ‘not	  objective’,	  and	  that	  the	  locus	  of	  objectivity	  is	  causal	  structure,	   as	   represented	   by	   causal	   equations,	   not	   token	   causation	   (Halpern	   and	  Hitchcock,	   2014).	   Accordingly	   Halpern	   and	   Hitchcock	   (2014)	   develop	   a	   notion	   of	  ‘defaults’	  and	  ‘normalcy’,	  which	  tries	  to	  capture	  our	  actual,	  subjective	  judgments	  of	  token	   causation,	   in	   cases	   of	   omissions	   and	   elsewhere.	   I	   agree	   with	   Halpern	   and Hitchcock	   that	   causal	   structure	   is	   more	   fundamental	   than	   token	   causation,	   but	   I	  think	  their	  account	  falls	  short	  in	  two	  points.	  	  First,	   to	   make	   the	   case	   clear	   we	   need	   a	   metaphysical	   account	   of	   causal	  structure—we	  know	  that	   structural	  equations	  are	  supposed	   to	  be	   the	  appropriate	  representation	  of	  the	  structure,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  yet	  tell	  us	  what	  that	  structure	  is.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  robust	  account	  of	  processes	  developed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  can	  be	  employed	  here.	  Secondly,	  it	  seems	  a	  category	  mistake	  to	  relegate	  token	  causation	  to	   the	   merely	   subjective.	   Token	   causal	   judgments	   and	   explanations	   are	   indeed	  something	  we	  humans	  do,	  and	  are	  hence	  subject	  to	  our	  cognitive	  quirks,	  but	  token	  causation	  is	  that	  at	  which	  our	  judgments	  are	  aimed.	  It	  may	  very	  well	  be	  correct	  to	  think	   that	   token	   causation	   in	   fact	   has	   a	   secondary	   status	   compared	   to	   causal	  structure,	  but	   this	   secondary	   status	   should	  be	  expressed	   in	   terms	  of	  metaphysical	  relations,	   not	   by	   conflating	   token	   causation	   and	   token	   causal	   judgments.	   In	   what	  follows	   I	   intend	   to	   employ	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   default	   as	   developed	   in	   the	   previous	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section	  to	  show	  both	  how	  token	  causation	  depends	  on	  processes,	  and	  secondly,	  how	  this	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  omissions	  as	  genuine	  cases	  of	  causation,	  albeit	  ones	  of	  metaphysically	  secondary	  status.	  	  Typical	   cases	   of	   token	   causation	   will	   be	   described	   as	   interactions	   of	   two	  processes,	   with	   the	   token	   effect	   lying	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   the	   two	   processes.	  Crucially,	  the	  token	  effect	  will	  be	  a	  default	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  process,	  and	  a	  deviant	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  other	  process.	  When	  looking	  at	  a	  token	  effect,	  then,	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  two	  questions:	  	  (1)	   What	   is	   the	   process	   relative	   to	   which	   e	   is	   a	   default	   stage?  (2)	   What	   is	   the	  process	   relative	   to	  which	  e	   is	   a	  deviant	   stage? The	   cause	  of	  e	  will	   lie	   somewhere	  along	  the	  process	  relative	  to	  which	  e	  is	  a	  default.	  The	  intersections	  relevant	  to	  token	  causations	   are	   interruptions.	   A	   process	   p1	   interrupts	   another	   process	   p2	   if	   the	  outcome	  that	  is	  the	  intersection	  of	  p1	  and	  p2	  is	  a	  deviant	  relative	  to	  p2	  and	  a	  default	  relative	  to	  p1.	  In	  Poisoning,	  Assassin	  poisons	  Victim’s	  coffee.	  Victim	  drinks	  the	  coffee.	  Victim	  dies.	  We	   recognize	  Victim’s	   death	   as	   a	   deviant	   outcome	  because	   staying	   alive	   is	   a	  relatively	  stable	  state	  for	  a	  healthy	  human	  being.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  stable	  state	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  inertial	  motion	  is	  a	  uniform	  process,	  of	  course,	  since	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  stable	  state	  of	  being	  alive,	  many	  processes	  have	   to	  continue	  working	   together,	  whereas	  inertial	  motion	  is	  self-­‐‑sufficient.	  Victim’s	  death,	  then,	  requires	  the	  extended	  notion	  of	  a	  default,	  which	  we	  arrived	  at	  through	  the	  analogy	  laid	  out	  above.	  The	  stable	  state	  of	  Victim’s	   life	  was	  supported	  by	  several	  processes.	  To	  end	  that	  relatively	  stable	  state,	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  contributing	  processes	  must	  have	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been	   interrupted.	   In	   searching	   for	   the	   cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death,	   then,	  we	   look	   for	   a	  deviant	   relative	   to	   one	   of	   the	   processes	   supporting	   Victim’s	   ongoing	   survival.	   A	  pathologist	   might	   determine	   that	   Victim’s	   brain	   lacked	   oxygen	   for	   an	   extended	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  lack	  of	  oxygen	  in	  Victim’s	  brain	  is	  a	  deviant	  stage	  relative	  to	  the	  process	  of	  respiration	  and	  transportation	  of	  oxygen	   in	  Victim’s	  body.	  The	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death	  will	  be	  found	  if	  we	  find	  the	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	  interruption	  of	  the	  process	  transporting	  oxygen	  to	  Victim’s	  brain.	  This	  process	  is	  of	  course	  the	  process	  of	  Victim’s	  being	  poisoned:	  Victim’s	  blood	  lacking	  oxygen	  due	  to	  important	  enzymes	  being	  blocked	  off,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  suitable	  inhibitor,	  the	  ingestion	  of	  the	  inhibitor	  through	  Victim’s	  drinking	  of	   the	   coffee,	   the	  presence	  of	   the	   inhibitor	   in	   the	   coffee	  due	  to	  Assassin’s	  poisoning	  to	  coffee.	  Where	  we	  stop	  in	  tracing	  back	  this	  process	  is	  in	  part	  a	  matter	  of	  our	  interests.	  As	  pathologists,	  for	  example,	  we	  might	  be	  content	  to	  note	  that	   the	  cause	  of	  death	  was	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  suitable	   inhibitor	   in	  Victim’s	  bloodstream,	  whereas	   as	   criminal	   investigators	  we	  will	   have	   to	   go	  beyond	   that	   to	  find	  out	  how	  the	  inhibitor	  got	  into	  Victim’s	  bloodstream	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  cause	  is	  not	  a single event, but a string of stages in an unfolding process. My	   suggestion,	   then,	   is	   that	   we	   should	   understand	   token	   causation	   as	   the	  interruption	  of	  one	  process	  by	  another.	  What	  it	  means	  for	  one	  process	  to	  interrupt	  the	  other	  is	  in	  turn	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  default/deviant	  distinction:	  a	  process	  
p1	   interrupts	   another	   process	   p2	  if	   the	   intersection	   of	   p1	  and	   p2	   is	   a	   default	   stage	  relative	  to	  p1	  and	  a	  deviant	  stage	  relative	  to	  p2.	  Let’s	  apply	   this	   recipe	   to	  Omission	   and	  Prevention.	  Hitchcock	   treats	   the	   two	  alike,	  but	  I	  actually	  think	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  between	  the	  two cases. 
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Omission,	  recall,	  was	  a	  case	  where	  Assassin	  poisons	  Victim’s	  coffee,	  and	  Bodyguard,	  while	   in	   possession	   of	   the	   antidote,	   fails	   to	   administer	   it.	   As	   a	   result,	   Victim	  dies.	  
Prevention,	   by	   contrast,	   is	   the	   case	   where	   Bodyguard	   in	   fact	   administers	   the	  antidote,	  and	  Victim	  survives.	    In	  Omission,	  Hitchcock	  argued,	  Assassin’s	  poisoning	  of	   the	   coffee	   counts	   as	   a	   cause	   of	   Victim’s	   death,	   because	   the	   poisoning	   and	   the	  death	   form	  a	   self-­‐‑contained	  network,	   and	   the	  death	   is	   counterfactually	  dependent	  on	  the	  poisoning;	  the	  failure	  to	  administer	  the	  antidote,	  by	  contrast,	  does	  not	  count	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death,	  although	  Victim’s	  death	  is	  counterfactually	  dependent	  on	  it,	  because	  the	  failure	  to	  administer	  the	  antidote	  and	  the	  death	  do	  not	  form	  a	  self-­‐‑contained	  network.	  Notice,	  though,	  that	  Hitchcock	  is	  forced	  to	  give	  the	  same	  analysis	  of	  Prevention	  (Hitchcock,	  2007,	  513).	  The	  causal	  model	  for	  Prevention	  is: 	  A=1	   if	   Assassin	   poisons	   the	   coffee,	   0	   if	   not;	    B=1	   if	   Bodyguard	   administers	   the	  antidote,	  0	  if	  not;	  D=1	  if	  Victim	  dies,	  0	  if	  not.	  The	  equations	  are:	  A=1,	  B=1,	  D=A&¬B.	  Once	   again	   the	   network	   {A,D}	   is	   self-­‐‑contained,	   which	   means	   that	  counterfactual	   dependence	   is	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   for	   token	   causation.	   Since	  Victim’s	   survival	   does	   not	   depend	   counterfactually	   on	   Assassin’s	   poisoning	   of	   the	  coffee,	   Assassin’s	   poisoning	   does	   not	   count	   as	   a	   cause	   of	   Victim’s	   survival,	   which	  seems	  right.	  Also	  like	  in	  Omission,	  {B,D}	  is	  not	  a	  self-­‐‑contained	  network,	  and	  hence	  Bodyguard’s	   action	   is	   also	   not	   a	   cause	   of	   Victim’s	   survival,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	  Victim’s	   survival	   counterfactually	   depends	   on	   it,	   and	   for	   the	   same	   reason	   that	  Bodyguard’s	   failure	   to	   administer	   an	   antidote	   in	   Omission	   was	   not	   a	   cause	   of	  Victim’s	   death.19	  	  Hitchcock’s	   recipe	   rules	   that	   the	  dependence	   of	  Victim’s	   survival	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  To	  be	  fair,	  Hitchcock	  strictly	  speaking	  only	  says	  that	  his	  recipe	  does	  not	  deliver	  a	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on	  Bodyguard’s	  administering	  the	  antidote	  in	  Prevention	   is	   ‘parasitic’	  on	  Assassin’s	  actions	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   the	   dependence	   of	   Victim’s	   death	   on	   Bodyguard’s	  inaction	  had	  been	  parasitic	   in	  Omission.	  But	   it	  seems	  to	  me	  at	   least,	   that	   there	   is	  a	  striking	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   cases:	   I	   am	   much	   more	   inclined	   to	   call	  Bodyguard’s	  administering	  of	  the	  antidote	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  survival,	  than	  I	  am	  to	  call	  his	  failure	  to	  do	  so	  in	  Omission	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death.	  Hitchcock’s	  approach	  does	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  intuition	  of	  difference.	  	  Here	  is	  what	  my	  proposal	  says	  about	  Omission:	  Just	  as	  in	  Poisoning,	  Victim’s	  death	   is	   a	   deviant	   outcome	   relative	   to	   the	   stable	   state	   of	   Victim’s	   being	   alive.	   In	  looking	  for	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death,	  we	  find	  that	  one	  of	  the	  processes	  required	  for	  maintaining	   the	   stable	   state	   of	   Victim’s	   life	   was	   interrupted	   by	   another	   process,	  which	  could	  be	  traced	  back	  all	  the	  way	  to	  Assassin	  poisoning	  the	  coffee.	  Bodyguard’s	  action	  or	  inaction	  does	  not	  come	  into	  it,	  which	  is	  why	  we	  are	  not	  especially	  inclined	  to	  call	  Bodyguard’s	  failure	  to	  administer	  the	  antidote	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death.	  But	  why	  does	  Bodyguard’s	  inaction	  ‘not	  come	  into	  it’?	  Intuitively,	   because	   the	   relevant	   processes	   take	  place	  within	  Victim’s	   body,	  whereas	  Bodyguard	  is	  a	  system	  (largely)	   independent	  of	  Victim.	  While	  I	  think	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  clear	  verdict in	  cases	  where	  the	  network	  is	  not	  self-­‐‑contained.	  Even	  so,	  his	  recipe	  still	  has	  to	  treat	  Bodyguard’s	  inaction	  in	  Omission	  and	  Bodyguard’s	  action	  in	  Prevention	  as	  causally	  alike,	  so	  either	  both	  are	  causes	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  networks	  they	  are	  in	  are	  not	  self-­‐‑contained,	  or	  neither	  is.	  The	  intuition	  of	  difference	  remains	  unexplained.	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captures	   something	   important,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   find	   it	   dissatisfying.	   After	   all,	   Victim’s	  body	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  closed	  system:	  without	  oxygen	  to	  breathe	  he	  would	  be	  dead	  without	  the	  poison.	  Moreover,	  presuming	  that	  Bodyguard	  is	  in	  the	  vicinity	  when	  all	  of	  this	  occurs,	  there	  are	  any	  number	  of	  physical	  processes	  involving	  both	  Victim	  and	  Bodyguard:	  light	  being	  reflected	  and	  absorbed,	  sounds	  being	  transmitted…	  .	  So	  what	  is	  different	  about	  the	  processes	  resulting	  in	  Victim’s	  death?	  	  Intuitively,	   again,	   the	  processes	   that	  do	   take	  place	  between	  Bodyguard	  and	  Victim	   are	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   poisoning.	   Using	   the	   analysis	   from	   above,	  we	   can	   say	  more	  precisely	   that	   the	   reason	  Bodyguard’s	  actions	  are	   irrelevant,	   is	   that	   they	  are	  not	   interruptions	   of	   either	   the	   processes	   supporting	   Victim’s	   survival,	   or	   of	   the	  process	   interrupting	  one	  of	   those	  processes.	  To	  be	  relevant	   to	  a	  particular	  case	  of	  token	  causation,	  a	  process,	  or	  a	  stage	  of	  a	  process,	  must	  either	  be	  (a	  part	  of)	  one	  of	  the	   processes	   the	   intersection	   of	  which	   constitutes	   the	   token	   effect,	   or	   it	  must	   be	  (part	  of)	  a	  process	  that	  is	  an	  interruption	  of	  such	  a	  process.	  None	  of	  the	  processes	  Bodyguard	  is	  engaged	  in	  are	  relevant	  in	  this	  sense.	  We	  may	  still	  be	  inclined	  to	  hold	  Bodyguard	  responsible	  in	  some	  sense,	  but	  we	  should	  not	  mistake	  that	  for	  taking	  his	  lack	  of	  action	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  Victim’s	  death.	  Perhaps	  his	  inaction	  amounts	  to	  a	  breach	  of	  contract,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  negligence.	  	  Contrast	  this	  with	  the	  case	  of	  Prevention.	  Relative	  to	  the	  various	  processes	  involved	  in	  Victim’s	  bodily	  functions,	  Victim’s	  being	  alive	  at	  time	  t1	  after	  drinking	  the	  coffee	  is	  a	  default	  state.	  Relative	  to	  having	  been	  poisoned	  at	  t,	  however,	  Victim’s	  being	  alive	  at	  t1	  is	  a	  deviant	  state.	  We	  need	  to	  look	  for	  a	  process	  relative	  to	  which	  Victim’s	  being	  alive	   at	   t1	   is	   a	   default.	   Victim’s	   survival	   is	   a	   default	   relative	   to	   the	   process	   that,	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working	   backwards	   again,	   consists	   of:	   the	   binding	   of	   the	   poison	   by	   another	  substance,	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   substance	   with	   a	   strong	   affinity	   for	   the	   poison,	   the	  injection	   of	   that	   substance	   into	   Victim’s	   bloodstream	   by	   Bodyguard.	   Bodyguard’s	  administering	   the	   antidote	   is	   a	   cause	   of	   Victim’s	   survival,	   because	   it	   is	   part	   of	   a	  process	   relative	   to	  which	  Victim’s	   being	   alive	   at	   t1	  is	   a	   default	   state.	  Unlike	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Omission,	  Bodyguard	  performs	  an	  action	  that	  is	  a	  stage	  in	  a	  process,	  which	  is	  one	   of	   the	   two	   processes	   that	   have	   Victim’s	   survival	   at	   their	   intersection.	   The	  improved	  notion	  of	  a	  default,	  then,	  allows	  us	  to	  explain	  differences	  among	  cases	  that	  Hitchcock’s	  recipe	  treated	  alike.	  	  What	   about	   cases	   where	   we	   do	   want	   to	   count	   omissions	   or	   absences	   as	  causes?	  Arguably	  such	  a	  case	  can	  be	  constructed	  from	  Victim’s	  death	  above.	  Victim’s	  death	  is	  brought	  about,	  ultimately,	  by	  absence	  of	  oxygen	  in	  Victim’s	  bloodstream.	  So	  the	   absence	   of	   something,	   oxygen,	   caused	   the	   death.	   That	   looks	   like	   a	   case	   of	   a	  negative	   event	   acting	   as	   a	   cause,	   which	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   in	   conflict	   with	   process	  theory.	  But	  based	  on	  what	  has	  been	  said	  so	  far,	  the	  process	  theorist	  has	  an	  answer.	  The	  reason	  lack	  of	  oxygen	  is	  a	  cause	  in	  this	  case	  is	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  oxygen	  in	  the	  bloodstream	  is	  a	  deviant	  stage	  relative	  to	  the	  process	  of	  breathing,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	   processes	   supporting	   Victim’s	   being	   alive.	   Victim’s	   mouth	   and	   lungs	   are	  expanding	  and	  contracting	  as	  usual,	  and	  oxygen	  is	  being	  taken	  in.	  But	  as	  the	  oxygen	  reaches	  the	  bloodstream,	  instead	  of	  being	  transported	  to	  Victim’s	  brain,	  it	  is	  bound	  by	   the	   inhibitors	   present	   in	   Victim’s	   bloodstream.	   The	   process	   of	   transporting	  oxygen	   to	   Victim’s	   brain	   is	   interrupted,	   and	   Victim	   dies.	   It	   is	   because	   Victim’s	  survival	  requires	  a	  process	  that	  very	  much	   involves	  positive	  events	  and	  presences	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(in	   particular:	   the	   presence	   of	   oxygen)	   that	   interrupting	   this	   process	   leads	   to	  Victim’s	  death.	  The	   interruption	   itself	   is	  a	  positive	  event:	   the	   inhibitor	  binding	   the 
oxygen is about as physical a connection as anyone can ask for. 
Using the notion of a default, the process theorist can count some cases of 
absences as cases of causation, without having to count all of them as causes. That 
is as it should be, given that we only want to count some cases of omissions as 
causally relevant, but not others. In fact, I think the use of defaults is more than 
just a convenient tool for the process theorist in these cases. What the discussion 
above shows is that ‘omissions’ or ‘absences’ only enter into the causal nexus 
when they are interruptions of processes. An absence becomes causally relevant as 
such only when it is a deviant stage, and as I argued above, the status of being a 
default or a deviant is assigned relative to a process. It is important to note, 
though, that processes are interrupted by other processes. Absences depend 
metaphysically on presences, just like holes in an Emmental depend on the 
surrounding cheese. 
The process theorist thereby gives an account of causation by omission, 
without committing to omissions as ontologically fundamental entities. It will be 
helpful to contrast this approach to omissions with a slightly less committed, more 
Humean account of (apparent) causation by omission. On this account, developed 
by Helen Beebee, omissions (and negative events more generally) do not exist and 
are never literally involved in causation. We give causal explanations involving 
omissions, but we have to distinguish the role omissions play in such causal 
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explanations from the role true causes play in such explanations. Explanations 
involving omissions can be adequate as explanations, because the omission is 
relevant, but omissions are not what make such explanations true. The relevance 
of omissions is a matter of norms, not causes. 	  An	   important	  difference	  between	   the	  account	  developed	  here	  and	  accounts	  like	  Beebee’s	  is	  that	  I	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  omissions	  or	  absences,	  I	  merely	  relegate	  them	  to	  metaphysically	  secondary	  status	  vis-­‐‑á-­‐‑vis	  processes.	  The	  difference	  lies	   in	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  process	  theorist,	  as	  I	  have	  characterized	  her,	   is	  able	  to	  say	  more	   about	   how	   omissions	   become	   relevant	   to	   causation,	   not	   just	   causal	  explanation.	  They	  are	  relevant	  when	  they	  constitute	  interruptions	  of	  processes.	  But	  their	  status	  as	  interruptions	  depends	  on	  the	  more	  fundamental	  existence	  of	  modally	  robust	  processes,	  of	  which	  we	  can	  say	  how	  they	  would	  have	  unfolded,	  had	  they	  not	  been	  interrupted.	  An	  interruption	  is	  a	  particular	  stage	  in	  a	  process	  which	  is	  deviant	  relevant	  to	  that	  process.	  At	  least	  some	  such	  deviant	  stages	  will	  be	  constituted	  by	  an	  absence	  or	  lack	  of	  something,	  instead	  of	  a	  presence.	  	  Both	   Beebee’s	   account	   and	   my	   account	   agree	   that	   causal	   explanations	  provide	  modal	  information,	  that	  is,	  information	  about	  how	  things	  would	  have	  gone	  under	  different	  circumstances.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  causal	  explanations	  invoking	  absences,	  for	  Beebee	   that	  means	  we	  are	  given	   information	  about	   the	  causal	   structure	  of	   the	  closest	   possible	   worlds	   in	   which	   the—actually	   absent—event	   indeed	   occurs.	   For	  example,	  to	  explain	  Victim’s	  death	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  oxygen	  in	  his	  blood	  is	  to	  describe	  how	  Victim’s	  causal	  history	  would	  have	  gone,	  had	  oxygen	  been	  present	  in	   his	   blood:	   he	   would	   not	   have	   died.	   The	   modal	   information	   does	   not	   concern	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absences,	   but	   presences	   in	   nearby	   possible	   worlds.	   By	   contrast,	   on	   the	   view	   I’m	  proposing	   here,	   the	  modal	   information	   is	   about	   what	   would	   have	   happened	   to	   a	  modally	   robust	   process	   which	   takes	   place	   in	   this	   world,	   and	   which	   is	   in	   fact	  interrupted.	   Process-­‐‑theoretic	   explanations	   provide	   information	   about	   the	   causal	  structure	   of	   this	   world,	   and	   do	   not	   need	   to	   invoke	   the	   causal	   structure	   of	   other	  possible	  worlds.	  Of	  course,	  the	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  this	  is	  the	  acceptance	  of	  un-­‐‑Humean,	  modally	  robust	  entities.	  	  For	   some	   the	   price	   of	   accepting	   (modally	   robust)	   individual	   processes	   and	  stable	   systems	   may	   be	   too	   high.	   The	   alternative	   would	   be	   to	   go	   subjective	   on	  absences,	   not	   only	   in	   cases	   of	   omissions,	   but	   cases	   of	   negative	   events	   in	   general.	  There	  is	  nothing	  special	  about	  Victim’s	  blood	  lacking	  oxygen,	  it’s	  just	  that	  it	  is not 
what we expected. Relevance becomes a matter purely of our expectations, not a 
feature tied to anything going on in the world independent of such expectations. 
That is a possibility, of course, and it is closer to Hume’s original account than 
contemporary Humean accounts. I do not find it particularly attractive. True, what 
counts as regular and stable is tied to human (time-)scales. But that does not mean 
that this stability is not real. It just means that like all stability, it is relative 
stability, not absolute stability. 	  What	   about	   Preemption?	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   Hall’s	   approach,	  preemptions	   are	   usually	   thought	   of	   as	   problems	   for	   the	   counterfactual	   theorist.	  What	  needs	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  Preemption	  cases	  is	  why	  an	  event,	  c,	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  an	  event	   e,	   but	   another	   event,	   a,	   is	   not.	   We	   arrive	   at	   this	   problem,	   because	   the	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counterfactual	  analysis	  of	  causation	  seems	  to	  result	  in	  neither	  a	  nor	  c	  being	  causes	  of	  e,	  since	   if	  one	  had	  not	  happened,	  the	  other	  would	  still	  have	  brought	  about	  e.	  To	  use	  the	  example	  from	  above:	  	  
Preemption	  Assassin	  puts	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  poison	  into	  Victim’s	  coffee.	  Unbeknownst	  to	  him,	  Badgirl	  also	  poisons	  Victim’s	  coffee,	  but	  with	  a	  different	  poison	  that	  acts	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  Assassin’s	  poison,	  while	  still	  remaining	  lethal	  itself.	  Victim	  drinks	  the	  coffee	  and	  dies.	  For	   the	   process	   theorist,	   this	   case	   is	   not	   especially	   puzzling.	   Victim’s	   death	   is	   a	  deviant	  outcome,	  since	  Victim’s	  being	  alive	  was	  a	  relatively	  stable	  state	  for	  Victim	  to	  be	  in,	  just	  like	  in	  all	  the	  other	  examples	  before.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  process	  relative	  to	  which	  it	  is	  a	  default	  stage:	  the	  process	  that	  begins	  with	  Badgirl’s	  poisoning	  of	  the	  coffee.	   So	   far,	   everything	   is	   completely	   analogous	   to	   the	   simple	   case	   of	  Poisoning.	  The	  situation	  in	  Preemption	  is	  slightly	  more	  complicated	  only	  in	  that	  there	  is	  a	  third	  process	  going	  on,	  the	  one	  that	  starts	  with Assassin’s poisoning of the coffee. 
Badgirl’s poisoning of the coffee first interrupts the process started by Assassin’s 
poisoning, and later interrupts one of the processes supporting the stable state of 
Victim’s life. The process started by Badgirl’s action then interrupts two other 
processes, one of which had the same default outcome as the one started by 
Badgirl: Victim’s death. But from the process theorist’s perspective, the fact that 
another process was underway which had the same default outcome does nothing 
to undermine the status of the process started by Badgirl as the causally 
efficacious one. For the process theorist all that matters is which process goes 
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through, not what would have happened otherwise. Hence there is no need to mask 
the other process to reveal counterfactual dependence, as Hall suggested. 	  The	  causal	  process	  theorist,	  then,	  can	  use	  defaults	  to	  address	  both	  causation	  by	   omission	   and	   causation	   by	   preemption.	   That	   is	   a	   significant	   advantage	   over	  either	  Hitchcock’s	  or	  Hall’s	   recipe,	   since	   their	   respective	   recipes	  were	  designed	   to	  deal	  with	  only	  one	  type	  of	  counterexample.	  Moreover,	  the	  use	  of	  defaults	  suggested	  here	  was	  able	  to	  explain	  differences	  between	  cases	  that	  Hitchcock’s	  account	  had	  to	  treat	  alike.	  	  A	   final	   problem	   one	   might	   consider	   for	   the	   account	   I’ve	   described	   might	   be	  situations	   where	   the	   intersection	   of	   two	   processes	   results	   in	   the	   interruption	   of	  both.20	  	  
Explosion	  A	  block	  of	  dynamite	  is	  at	  rest	  on	  the	  ground.	  A	  flame	  on	  a	  fuse	  is	  traveling	  towards	  it.	  As	  the	  two	  processes	  intersect,	  an	  explosion	  occurs.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  block	  of	  dynamite	  is	  no	  longer	  intact,	  and	  the	  flame	  has	  ceased	  to	  travel	  along	  the	  fuse.	  
In this case, both processes are interrupted as a result of the intersection. My 
proposal as originally stated suggests that token causation happens where two 
processes intersect, and the intersection is a deviant with respect to one process, 
but a default with respect to the other. In the example as described, the intersection 
appears to be deviant with respect to both processes. I believe my original 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  one	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  bringing	  such	  cases	  to	  my	  attention.	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proposal can be generalized without much difficulty to cover cases like these, by 
weakening the requirement. Token causation is the intersection of two or more 
processes, which is a deviant stage with respect to at least one of the processes 
involved. This statement is weaker than the previous one, but also more generally, 
applying both to cases like Explosion, but also more generally to cases involving 
more than one process. 	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  is	  useful	  in	  understanding	  cases	  of	  token	  causation.	  I	  first	  showed	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  is	  currently	  employed	  by	  counterfactual	   theorists	   to	  respond	  to	  counterexamples.	   I	   then	  clarified	  the	  notion	  of	   a	   default,	   and	   it	   turned	   out	   that	   the	   status	   of	   being	   a	   default	   is	   relative	   to	   a	  process,	   either	   in	   the	   straightforward	   sense	  of	   contributing	   to	   the	  uniformity	   of	   a	  process,	  or	  in	  the	  extended	  sense	  of	  being	  a	  stage	  in	  a	  process	  that	  contributes	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  a	  complex	  system.	  In	  the	  final	  section	  I	  have	  used	  this	  improved	  notion	  of	  a	   default	   to	   show	   how	   the	   process	   theorist	   can	   respond	   to	   cases	   of	   causation	   by	  omission.	  I	  hope	  that	  what	  this	  discussion	  has	  shown	  is	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  is	  a	   useful	   tool	   for	   understanding	   token	   causation,	   but	   that	   it	   is	  most	   useful	   for	   the	  process	  theorist.	  	  Even	  those	  unpersuaded	  by	  the	  alternative	  account	  of	  causation	  sketched	  in	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  may	  find	  some	  use	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	  developed	  in	  this	  paper.	  For	  while	  Hitchcock	  and	  Hall	  introduced	  this	  notion	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the,	  generally	   Humean,	   idea	   that	   causal	   dependence	   should	   be	   understood	   as	  counterfactual	  dependence,	  what	  I	  have	  shown	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  default	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   belonging	   to	   a	   rather	   un-­‐‑Humean	   conception	   of	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causation	  involving	  modally	  robust	  individual	  processes.	  A	  committed	  Humean	  will	  likely	   find	   such	   a	   notion	   unattractive.	   If	   so,	   she	   should	   also	   stay	   away	   from	   the	  notion	  of	  defaults.	   Friends	  of	   the	  process	   theory,	  by	   contrast,	  may	   find	   the	  notion	  helpful	  in	  further	  developing	  their	  view.	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